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Rorty, Pragmatism, and Metaphysics
1 Rorty understands ‘metaphysics’ as “a permanent neutral matrix for inquiry.”1 Given the
kind of language Rorty uses to characterise metaphysics,2 I think it would not be
unreasonable to suppose he conceives of ‘metaphysics’ in terms of Hilary Putnam’s notion
of ‘metaphysical realism.’ According to metaphysical realism, “the world consists of some
fixed  totality  of  mind-independent  objects.  There  is  exactly  one  true  and  complete
description of ‘the way the world is.’ Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation
between  words  or  thought-signs  and  external  things  and  sets  of  things.”3 The
Weltanschauung of the metaphysical realist/metaphysician is expressed by Rorty in the
following manner: “For our notion of the world – it  will  be said – is not a notion of
unquestioned beliefs, or unquestionable beliefs, or ideally coherent beliefs, but rather of a
hard,  unyielding,  rigid  être-en-soi which  stands  aloof,  sublimely  indifferent  to  the
attentions we lavish upon it.”4 Such a way of portraying a genus of inquiry principally
concerned with establishing a ‘God’s-eye-view’ is summed up by Rorty in a later work: “I
use ‘metaphysics’ as the name of the belief in something non-human which justifies our
deep attachments.”5 By presenting metaphysics as comprising ‘non-human’ dimensions,
where what is ‘non-human’ appears to refer to something which transcends the locus of
social and cultural practice, Rorty regards metaphysics as the great nemesis of pragmatism
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– as he (in)famously writes, “[t]he pragmatist … does not think of himself as any kind of
metaphysician.”6
2 According to Rorty, pragmatism is the apotheosis of the secular age that runs through
Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Dewey, where the vocabulary of foundationalism and
essentialism had been debunked in favour of a fundamentally different mode of discourse
and value-system, where the exigencies of our socio-political and cultural practices are
regarded as the proper grounds and indications of meaning and normativity. Crucially,
for Rorty, the central aspect of the apparent paradigm shift from the modern era to the
‘postmodern’ era is the gradual abandonment of traditional categorial/onto-theological
dualisms, such as essence/accident, appearance/reality, freedom/nature, mind/body, etc.
7 Unlike Hegel, who argues that these dualisms can be rejected on the basis that those
very dualisms are in fact are capable of being sublated in favour of a dialectical conceptual
framework, Rorty thinks that the problem with these binary categories of thought is how
they  exhibit  an  allegedly  pathological  cognitive  propensity  for  regarding  normative
constraints and the ultimate grounds for the justification of our beliefs as being beyond
our  practices.8 As  Carl  Sachs  writes,  “[m]etaphysics,  thus  understood,  consists  of  the
subordination of one’s descriptions of the world – one’s ‘vocabularies,’ in Rortyan terms –
to something beyond all  of our normative social practices – something beyond us,  to
which we are answerable, and which anchors our descriptions of the world, society, and
self in something beyond those descriptions.”9 The basic notion of value, according to
Rorty, thus undergoes radical critique in the secular age, because we shift from seeing
norms as extra-human dictates to seeing norms as, to use Robert Brandom’s terminology,
“social achievements,”10 in that what is deemed appropriate or inappropriate in a society
is not determined by any completely mind-independent stuff ‘out there.’ Rather, norms
are established by the intersubjective and rational practices between rational agents in a
society. In other words, norms get their normative purchase by virtue of being assented
to and acknowledged by a community of rational agents. Crucially, though, the practice of
assenting to and acknowledging normative constraints and normative entitlements does
not involve a crude constructivism or crude anti-realism. What this particular form of
social  engagement  involves  is  that  “the  precise  content  of  those  implicit  norms  is
determined through a ‘process of negotiation’ involving ourselves and those who attribute
norms to us.”11 By virtue of being a process of negotiation as opposed to a non-negotiated
process, what is deemed appropriate or inappropriate is never fixed but always subject to
“further assessment, challenge, defence, and correction.”12
3 In an obvious way, Rorty’s criticism of metaphysics is different to Kantian and Positivist
critiques of the science of being-qua-being: unlike the Kantian critique of the metaphysical
tradition,  Rorty  does  not  aim  to  expose  the  amphibolies,  paralogisms,  antinomies,
fallacies  of  subreption  and  hypostatisation,  and  transcendental  illusion  which  are
symptomatic of metaphysics; unlike the Logical Empiricist critique of the metaphysical
tradition, Rorty does not appeal to any form of verificationist principle, to conclude that
metaphysics is meaningless. Rather, Rorty appears to motivate his critique of inquiry into
the basic structure of the world on two grounds, grounds which he takes to be pragmatist:
(i) methodological-explanatory; and (ii) secular humanist.
4 With regard to (i), Rorty can appeal to the criticisms of Enlightenment rationalism made
by William James:
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Rationalism in general thinks it gets the fullness of truth by turning away from
sensation  to  conception,  conception  obviously  giving  the  more  universal  and
immutable picture. (James 1996: 105)
[The abstract philosophical universe is] far less an account of this actual world than
a clear addition built upon it, a classic sanctuary in which the rationalist fancy may
take refuge from the intolerably confused and gothic character which mere facts
present. It is no explanation of our concrete universe, it is another thing altogether,
a substitute for it, a remedy, a way of escape. (James 2000: 15)
5 This way of rejecting rationalism13 is also expressed in Schiller’s work14 where – as was
the fashion at the beginning of the pragmatist school – Hegelian idealism is regarded as
its most notorious exponent. Philosophical inquiry, for James and Schiller, must not be
conceived of in the way that rationalism characterised philosophical inquiry. While the
project  of  ‘pure  inquiry’15 aimed  to  provide  substantive  conceptions  of  truth  and
knowledge by avoiding corporeality and sociality,  thereby making metaphysics wholly
abstract,  James  and Schiller  conceived  of  pragmatism as  the  philosophical  school  of
thought  to  provide substantive conceptions  of  truth and knowledge by embedding  all
human capacities in the world. As James wrote, the most pressing problem with rationalism
is that it “seems too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a thing to speak
for the vast slow-breathing unconscious Kosmos with its dread abysses and its unknown
tides”  (James  2003:  146).  One  can,  therefore,  see  why  Rorty  partly  bases  his  anti-
representationalism, specifically his rejection of a view of the mind-world relation in
terms of our cognitive capacities mirroring a “hard, unyielding, rigid être-en-soi which
stands aloof, sublimely indifferent to the attentions we lavish upon it,” on James’s vocal
opposition to Cartesianism.16 For example, there is excellent reason to think James here
would enthusiastically support Rorty: 
A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all  upon a lot of inveterate
habits  dear  to  professional  philosopher.  He  turns  away  from  abstraction  and
insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles,
closed  systems,  and  pretended  absolutes  and  origins.  He  turns  towards
concreteness  and  adequacy,  towards  facts,  towards  action  and  towards  power.
(James 2000: 27) 
6 The picture of empirical reality as presented by Cartesianism is of a realm of separate and
inert objects, where such objects are governed by strict mechanical laws and constitute a
view of  nature as  being rather  “refined,”17 to  use  a  Jamesian turn-of-phrase.  Such a
framework is opposed to pragmatism, which does not see the intentional content of our
experience as a pastiche of fragmented objects,  but rather views our environment as
being phenomenologically robust and experientially vibrant. As James writes, “[b]ut I ask
you in all seriousness to look abroad on this colossal universe of concrete facts, on their
awful bewilderments, their surprises and cruelties, on the wildness which they show, and
then to tell me whether ‘refined’ is the one inevitable descriptive adjective that springs to
your lips” (James 2000: 15). For pragmatism, the world of experience, under the Cartesian
affection  for  abstract  landscapes,  is  dead  and  static,  not  alive  and  dynamic.18 More
basically,  the  allure  of  the  pragmatist  critique  of  the  early  modern  era,  to  use  an
expression from Adrian Moore, is that pragmatism is better able to make sense of things,
where it is exactly the practice of sense-making that Rorty thinks metaphysics and onto-
theological categorial systems fail to successfully perform in any way at all.
7 With regard to (ii), Rorty’s secular humanist critique of metaphysics, I previously claimed
that according to Rorty, the basic notion of value undergoes radical humanist critique in
the secular age, because we shift from seeing norms as extra-human dictates to seeing
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norms as social achievements.19 Such a shift amounted to the effective abandonment of the
metaphysical tradition, insofar as what was symptomatic of metaphysics was its attempt
to ground normativity in matters beyond human socio-cultural practice. As Rorty writes:
I  wish,  just  as  Conway  suggests,  ‘to  reject  only  that  pathological  quest  for
transcendent verities and ahistorical essences’ which Plato initiated and Nietzsche
mocked. […] But surely we have already had enough experience with attempts to
use the weapons of metaphysics against metaphysics? I think of British empiricism,
positivism,  contemporary  Australian  philosophical  physicalism,  and  the  like,  as
such attempts.  All  they  accomplished  was  to  replace  one  non-human source  of
justification (the  Will  of  God,  the  Idea  of  the  Good)  with another  (the  Intrinsic
Nature of Physical Reality). (Rorty 2001: 90-1)
8 While  the  rise  of  secular  humanist  axiology principally  begins  with Nietzsche,  Rorty
enlists  James a key ally in his  cultural  war against  metaphysics and its  alleged anti-
humanism.20 For that matter, there appears to be compelling reason to think Rorty is
justified to appeal to James: 
You see how naturally one comes to the humanistic principle: you can’t weed out
the human contribution. Our nouns and adjectives are all  humanised heirlooms,
and in the theories we build them into, the inner order and arrangement is wholly
dictated by human considerations. (James 2000: 111-2)21 
9 Although Rorty would admonish James for relying on the concept of ‘experience,’22 there
is still much in this passage for Rorty to find rather alluring: namely, what James writes in
terms of insisting on the ubiquity of intersubjective and socio-historical inquiry seems to
anticipate  his  own vision of  a  “post-Philosophical  culture,”23 “in which there  are  no
appeals to authority of any kind, including appeals to truth and rationality.”24 Given how
ordinary language, and the vocabulary and norms of both the Naturwissenschaften as well
as the Geisteswissenschaften are saturated by human practice, this signifies, for Rorty, that
we have not only broken free from a conception of human mindedness as the mirror of
nature, but also that we have – to use Nietzsche’s term – emerged from the “shadows of
God.”25 In  other  words,  according  to  Rorty,  the  great  metaphilosophical-cultural
consequence of  pragmatism and its  essential  humanist  commitments  is  the resulting
dismissal of the remaining pillars of representationalism and rationalism, a metaphysical
conception of truth and a metaphysical conception of objectivity. As he writes, “[truth is]
not  the  sort  of  thing one should expect  to  have an interesting philosophical  theory
about”;26 “[and we ought  to]  substitute  the  idea  of  ‘unforced agreement’  for  that  of
‘objectivity’.”27 In  place  of  metaphysical  notions  of  truth and objectivity,  Rorty,  who
regards himself as the philosophic heir of James and Dewey, proposes a nuanced epistemic 
theory  of  truth,  one  which  is  not identifiable  with  a  crude  idealised  warranted
assertibility:
For  pragmatists,  the  desire  for  objectivity  is  not  to  escape  the  limits  of  one’s
community,  but  simply  the  desire  for  as  much  intersubjective  agreement  as
possible, the desire to extend the reference of ‘us’ as far as we can. (Rorty 1991: 23)
10 Though Rorty has been roundly criticised for apparently advocating epistemic relativism
and showing contempt for any meaningful conception of truth,28 what he writes here
suggests  something  that  in  fact  places  him far  closer  to  Peirce  than Rorty  officially
countenances:  the  essence  of  pragmatism  is  to  clarify  our  philosophical  ideas  by
illustrating and reflecting on their role in our cognitive practices; and to be in a position
where we can genuinely clarify our ideas in this specific way requires us to “expand the
frontiers  of  inquiry.”29 Crucially,  though,  we  expand  the  frontiers  of  inquiry  by
continuously  playing  the  game  of  giving  and  asking  for  reasons,  which  widens  the
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‘conversations’30 between rational enquirers thereby enabling ideas to undergo “further
assessment, challenge, defence, and correction.”31
11 So far, I have suggested some pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s claim that pragmatism
is opposed to metaphysics is justified. However, in what follows, I shall argue that there
are  more  compelling  reasons  to  think  Rorty’s  metaphilosophical  characterisation  of
pragmatism is rather problematic on pragmatic grounds.
 
Pragmatism and Metaphysics
12 For  all  of  Rorty’s  confidence  in  pragmatism eo  ipso  being  dismissive  of  metaphysics,
Peirce,  who  is  arguably  the  founder  of  the  pragmatist  movement,  argues  for  the
indispensability of metaphysics: 
Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics – not by
any means  every  man who holds  the  ordinary  reasonings  of  metaphysicians  to
scorn – and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the
crude  and  uncriticised  metaphysics  with  which  they  are  packed.  We  must
philosophise, said the great naturalist Aristotle – if only to avoid philosophising.
(CP: 1.129)
13 Peirce argues that not only is it impossible to avoid metaphysics, but also that to reject
metaphysics is to do metaphysics. It is not just that ordinary language is packed with
metaphysical  concepts,32 but  even  those  conservative  naturalist  attitudes  such  as
positivism  and  eliminativist  varieties  of  nominalism  also  contain  metaphysical
commitments. So, for all of the positivists’ and eliminativists’ insistence that they have
successfully purged inquiry of metaphysics “in the spirit of Newton’s ‘hypotheses non
fingo’,”33 they are committed in some way to the very enterprise that they seek to reject.
There  is  therefore  something  self-undermining  about  anti-metaphysics,  which  shows
metaphysics  to be indispensable –  just  as  there is  something self-undermining about
denying the Principle of Non-Contradiction, insofar as to do so itself involves employing
the principle. To quote David Oderberg, who would agree with Peirce on this subject: 
Natural language is permeated and saturated by metaphysics, and has been so ever
since philosophy began with the pre-Socratics. […] The problem is in thinking that
there is a vantage point from which we can espy language in its ‘ordinary,’ pre-
metaphysical  state.  There  is  no  such  vantage  point  because  there  is  no  such
language to be observed in the first place.34
14 The  inevitability  of  metaphysics,  therefore,  consists  in  the  ubiquity  of  metaphysical
concepts in language.35 A similar claim is made by Jonathan Lowe, who writes: “[i]n my
view, all other forms of inquiry rest upon metaphysical presuppositions – thus making
metaphysics unavoidable – so that we should at least endeavour to do metaphysics with
our eyes open, rather than allowing it to exercise its influence upon us at the level of
uncritical assumption.”36
15 However, in response to this argument from Peirce, Rorty may claim that confidence in
interpreting Peirce as a defender of metaphysics is rather premature, as the following
passage appears to indicate: 
It will serve to show that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is
either  meaningless  gibberish  […]  or  else  is  downright  absurd;  so  that  all  such
rubbish  being  swept  away,  what  will  remain  of  philosophy  will  be  a  series  of
problems  capable  of  investigation  by  the  observational  methods  of  the  true
sciences. (CP: 5.423)
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16 The apparent proto-positivism and scientism of Peirce’s position also appears in other
areas of his philosophical writings:37
Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and only ceases to
use it when he does not know how to apply it. Experience of the method has not led
me  to  doubt  it,  but,  on  the  contrary,  scientific  investigation  has  had  the  most
wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion. (EP: 1.121)
17 Both the content and tone of these passages from Peirce can be reasonably taken as a
staunch defence of scientistic naturalism, a defence which would be especially welcome
in certain corners of the Anglo-American naturalist community. For example, Michael
Shermer,  Peter  Atkins,  and  Alex  Rosenberg  are  three  notable  thinkers  who  adopt
scientism  with  pride.  To  quote  Shermer  on  this  point:  “[s]cientism  is  a  scientific
worldview  that  encompasses  natural  explanations  for  all  phenomena,  eschews
supernatural explanations, and embraces empiricism and reason as the twin pillars of a
philosophy of life suitable for an Age of Science.”38 Compare this with Atkins’s claim that
“science,  with its  currently successful  pursuit  of  universal  competency […] should be
acknowledged  king.”39 And  compare  these  defences  of  scientism  with  Rosenberg’s
proposal that “we’ll call the worldview that all us atheists […] share ‘scientism.’ This is
the conviction that the methods of science are the only reliable ways to secure knowledge
of anything; that science’s description of the world is correct in its fundamentals; and
that when ‘complete,’ what science tells us will not be surprisingly different from what it
tells us today.”40 In other words, under such an account, there seems to be compelling
reason to admit that “scientific inquiry sets the standards for the acceptability of beliefs”:
41 not only does the method of scientific investigation provide a respectable and rigorous
standard for the justification of beliefs, the method of scientific investigation and only the
method of scientific investigation sets the criteria for acceptability simpliciter.  As Paul
Boghossian writes, “[w]e take science to be the only good way to arrive at reasonable
beliefs about what is true, at least in the realm of the purely factual. Hence, we defer to
science.”42
18 Given this, it would appear Rorty’s counter-argument against appealing to Peirce for a
pragmatist  defence of  metaphysics  sets  up the following problem:  Peirce’s  position is
incoherent,43 because he is  committed to both the indispensability of  metaphysics and
scientistic naturalism, which sets itself against it.44
19 However, in response to this Rortyan reading of Peirce, I propose that Rorty has a narrow 
understanding of the sense of metaphysics Peirce believes is indispensable to inquiry, to
the  extent  that  he  fails  to  draw  an  important  distinction  between  transcendent 
metaphysics  and  immanent  metaphysics:  when  explicating  Rorty’s  argument  against
metaphysics, one could see that Rorty takes ‘metaphysics’ and ‘theology’ to be equivalent,
since they are both typified by “the temptation to look for an escape from time and
chance” (Rorty 1989: xiii). As Sachs writes, “Rorty frames his disdain for metaphysics as a
radicalisation of Enlightenment disdain for theology, and for much the same reasons:
because it represents a stage of our cultural evolution that we need to fully get over, and
because  it  is  a  threat  to  liberal  democratic  institutions.”45 The  question,  though,  is
whether  Rorty  is  justified  in  thinking  ‘metaphysics’  and  ‘theology’  are  equivalent.  I
contend that Rorty is not justified in making such equivalence, and that Hegel and Peirce
arguably  provide  the  strongest  arguments  to  undermine  his  understanding  of
metaphysics. 
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20 Central to Hegelian metaphysics is the aim to reject nominalism about universals.46 For
Hegel, nominalism is inconsistent with the commitments of natural science; and realism
about  universals  is  necessarily  consistent  with  the  commitments  of  natural  science.
Hegel’s  arguments  for  those  two  claims  are  to  be  found in  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,
specifically in those sections of the work which discuss the content and methodology of
natural science,  what Hegel frequently calls ‘empirical physics’  (empirische Physik):  for
Hegel, natural science is empirical, in that it begins with the observation of phenomena in
nature.47 However, science is not simply an observational discipline in its entirety, as the
observations of  scientists  lead scientists  to “identify and describe laws and universal
kinds within the multitude of observable natural events and entities.”48 As Hegel himself
writes, “[s]cience is a theoretical and thinking consideration of nature […] [which] aims at
comprehending that which is universal in nature […] forces, laws, genera” (Hegel 1970 I:
196-7).  Therefore,  according  to  Hegel,  if  an  inquiry  into  the  natural  world  fails  to
establish commitments to universals and laws of nature, which have genuine nomological
properties, then that inquiry cannot be a legitimately scientific inquiry. The essence of
Hegel’s argument here appears to be shared in Peirce’s argument that nominalism is
inconsistent with the practices of science:49 Peirce claims that the nominalist idea of there
being no nomological phenomena is incapable of explaining why events/things/processes
occur in such a way that is formulated as following a law of nature – i.e. the paraphrasing
of propositions committed to non-Humean laws of nature is not something that coheres
with how science works.50
21 Above all, what plays a central role in Hegel’s criticisms of nominalism and eliminativist
attitudes to metaphysics tout  court  is  his  ingenious explanation of  the significance of
metaphysical inquiry in our lives:
It is true that Newton expressly warned physics to beware of metaphysics; but, to
his honour, let it be said that he did not conduct himself in accordance with this
warning at all. Only the animals are true blue physicists by this standard, since they
do  not  think:  whereas  humans,  in  contrast,  are  thinking  beings,  and  born
metaphysicians. All that matters here is whether the metaphysics that is employed
is of the right kind: and specifically whether […] we hold on to one-sided thought-
determinations  fixed  by  the  understanding,  so  that  they  form  the  basis  of  our
theoretical and of our practical action. (Hegel 1991: §98Z, 156)
22 What we find here is Hegel’s dismissal of the question concerning whether metaphysics
tout court is possible, and his insistence on asking the ‘real’ metametaphysical question,
‘What  kind  of  metaphysics  is  the  right  kind  of  metaphysics?’ The  new metametaphysical
challenge posed by Hegel amounts to a litmus test for any metaphysical system to not
merely be theoretically satisfying but also practically significant in a specific manner. The
specific sense of practical significance I have in mind concerns a broadly perfectionist
notion that our general understanding of how all things hang together, to use a Sellarsian
turn of phrase,51 enables us to achieve at homeness in the world. In other words, the kind of
metaphysics we are properly after is going to be sufficiently general/broad (hence not
‘one-sided’), and one which is a metaphysics of reason/speculative reflection (hence not
‘rigidly fixed by understanding’). The distinction, therefore, between reason (Vernunft)
and understanding (Verstand) is going to play a significant role in the development of the
right kind of metaphysics. For Hegel, the principal advantage of drawing this distinction
between reason and understanding is that we can be in a position to not be wrapped up in
the various dualisms which are the inevitable consequence of reflecting only from the
perspective of  understanding,  i.e.  purely  analytical  forms of  reflection.52 What  reason
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provides  consciousness  with  is  the  means  to  avoid  the  pitfalls  of  dualisms  and  the
problems  of  analysis  by  thinking  dialectically,53 since  reason  is  a  “form  of  holistic
explanation,  which  shows  how  all  finite  things  are  parts  of  a  wider  whole.”54 A
metaphysics which does not draw this distinction or one which conflates reason with
understanding will therefore not be the right kind of metaphysics. This is because failing
to draw the distinction between reason and understanding or conflating reason with
understanding results in a one-sided conception of thought.
23 The question we now need to ask is which metaphysical tradition, if any, satisfies Hegel’s
criteria for the right kind of metaphysics. Of course, a proper answer to such a question is
effectively the task of a monograph. However, for the purposes of this paper, I would like
to  very  briefly  discuss  two  metaphysical  theses.  The  first  concerns  the  general
metaphysical commitments of ancient Greek philosophy. As Hegel writes:
A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existences
as such, would not deserve the name of philosophy; the principles of ancient or
modern philosophies,  water,  or  matter,  or  atoms are thoughts,  universals,  ideal
entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us, that is, in their
sensuous individuality. (Hegel 1969: 154-5)
24 For Hegel, what is attractive about ancient philosophy is its identification of thought with
being  –  its  general  commitment  to  the  fundamentally  intelligible  nature  of  reality.
However, the basic deficiency with ancient metaphysics, one which is also exemplified by
the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, is its commitment to transcendent entities and relations.55
So,  for  all  of  the  attractive  features  of  ancient  metaphysics  –  its  commitments  to
universals and an intelligible structure of reality – it falls short of being the right kind of
metaphysics,  due  to  its  failure  in  its  exact  metaphysical  conceptions  of  the  relevant
metaphysical phenomena, such as universals. Given this, one may be inclined to suppose
that the right kind of metaphysics we are after is  going to be provided by immanent 
metaphysical traditions, such as Spinozism. However, whilst this metaphysical tradition
does have an advantage in terms of its broad naturalist commitments, Hegel thinks that
such a position is still not the right kind of metaphysics. This is because the philosophical
methodology that besets Spinozism, the modo geometrico, is not speculative enough,56 and
that Spinozism ends up with a monism with no room for individuals.57
25 Both  ancient  metaphysics  and  some  species  of  immanent  metaphysics  have  some
attractive features for Hegel. To use Moore’s expression, both traditions make concerted
efforts to make sense of things. However, it must equally be said that due to the various
respective failures of both metaphysical traditions, they are both ultimately not able to
properly  make  sense  of  things.  Sense-making,  at  least  in  the  way  I  am interpreting
Moore’s definition of metaphysics, for Hegelians, would require a commitment to a form
of naturalism that is both speculative and genuinely immanentist: neither a bifurcation of
reality into two ontologically separate realms nor any attempt to reduce some phenomena
to basic naturalistic components will  do the relevant philosophical  work to correctly
understand the world we inhabit. What this speculative naturalism aims to accomplish, in
its efforts to make sense of things, is to enable us to see that “[t]he empirical is not only
mere observing, hearing, feeling, perceiving particulars, but it also essentially consists in
finding species, universals and laws.”58
26 Like Hegel, Peirce is also focused on establishing the right kind of metaphysics. Contra 
Rorty, when Peirce writes 
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[i]t will serve to show that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is
either  meaningless  gibberish  […]  or  else  is  downright  absurd;  so  that  all  such
rubbish  being  swept  away,  what  will  remain  of  philosophy  will  be  a  series  of
problems  capable  of  investigation  by  the  observational  methods  of  the  true
sciences. (CP: 5.423)
27 Peirce is not claiming that metaphysics tout court be abandoned and consigned to the
flames; rather we should understand Peirce as rejecting a specific genus of metaphysical
inquiry, namely traditional onto-categorial metaphysics. In place of traditional categorial
ontology, Peirce aims to establish a new metaphysics. I think there is excellent evidence
for this when we apply the classic formulation of the Pragmatic Maxim59 to concepts such
as  ‘explanation’:  Peirce  aims  to  clarify  the  concept  of  explanation  by  using  all  three
categories – firstness, secondness, and thirdness. By establishing this holistic approach to
explanation, I take Peirce to argue that our explanans of the explanandum illustrates how
each specific determination is understood in relation to other determinations. Not only
that, though, the way in which each determination is fundamentally interrelated with
other determinations illustrates how experience reveals to us an ontologically complex
and  intelligibly  structured  order  of  things,  and  this  is  something  to  which  natural
scientific investigation is also committed. Understood in this way, I think there is good
reason  to  establish  a  powerful  philosophical  link  between  Hegelian  and  Peircean
metaphysics: both Hegel and Peirce seem to share the project of providing “a systematic
critique and overcoming of traditional ontological (categorial) thought in service of an
alternative, revisionary metaphysics.”60 Crucially, what this shows is that Rorty did not
see the important difference between the kind of metaphysical project that Hegel and
Peirce engender and the kind of metaphysical project he wishes to reject, and that Rorty
also mischaracterised Peirce as incoherent. 
28 My  pragmatist  criticism of  Rorty  thus  far  has  focused  on  his  narrow conception  of
metaphysics and his failure to deal with Peirce’s Indispensability Argument. However, I
think there is an additional pragmatist problem with his metaphilosophical position that
pragmatism  is  opposed  to  metaphysics  tout  court:  Rorty’s  Sellarsian  philosophical
anthropology and his proto-Brandomian theory of the constitution of norms are in fact
instances of metaphysical positions.
29 Like Sellars, Rorty is committed to the ‘manifest image of man,’ namely a conception of
human beings as normative, self-reflecting discursive agents. To quote Putnam on this
issue, “[l]et us recognise that one of our fundamental self-conceptualisations, one of our
fundamental ‘self-descriptions,’ in Rorty’s phrase, is that we are thinkers.”61 By conceiving
of ourselves qua the manifest image, it would appear that we are doing some variety of
metaphysics, where this variety of metaphysics does not require or involve any appeal to
onto-theological categories, nor does this variety of metaphysics involve transcending
the bounds of sense. Rather, this nuanced genus of metaphysics is a form of naturalism, a
naturalism according to which we understand what it is to be a human being in terms of
having a particular set of natural  capacities,  namely a capacity for discursivity and self-
consciousness. So,  for  Rorty  to  make  sense  of  his  own  philosophical  anthropological
commitments, he must have some metaphysical commitments. 
30 I earlier claimed that the basic notion of value, according to Rorty, undergoes radical
critique in the secular age, because we shift from seeing norms as extra-human dictates to
seeing norms as, to use Brandom’s terminology, “social achievements,” in that what is
deemed appropriate or inappropriate in a society is not determined by any completely
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mind-independent stuff ‘out there.’ Rather, norms are established by the intersubjective 
and  rational  practices  between  rational  agents  in  a  society.  By  conceiving  of  the
constitution of norms pragmatically, it would appear again that we are doing some variety
of metaphysics: firstly, if one rejects the representationalist notion that norms derive
their authority from factors independent of social practices, “one needs to have in place a
conception of nature as not being the sort of thing that has any authority”;62 secondly, if
one claims that norms derive their authority exclusively from our social practices, one
needs to have in place a conception of normativity as being the sort of thing that is
derivable from rational intersubjective practice. Crucially, however, neither conception
requires or involves any appeal to onto-theological categories. 
31 If  the  arguments  I  have  proposed against  Rorty  have  been successful,  then one  has
compelling reason to think his claim that pragmatism is anti-metaphysics tout court is
fundamentally mistaken: Rorty is correct to claim that pragmatism is eo ipso opposed to
non-humanistic approaches to axiology and rejects transcendent metaphysics, but this
does not mean pragmatism is anti-metaphysical.63 Moreover, for Rorty to be in a position
to make sense of his own philosophical commitments, he must engage in some kind of
immanent metaphysical project.
32 Given  the  permanent  deposit  of  nuanced  metaphysical  thought in  the  American
pragmatist tradition, one may well ask ‘What are the consequences of debunking Rorty’s
metaphilosophical interpretation of pragmatism?’ Arguably, the clearest consequence of
rejecting  Rorty’s  position  would  appear  to  be  ‘reconciling’  the  post-Kantian  idealist
tradition with the pragmatist tradition.64 The sense of reconciliation I have in mind here
is one which melts a barrier that has historically made idealists and pragmatists reluctant
to  find  at  homeness  with  one  another,  even  though  there  is  significant  positive
philosophical  overlap  between  the  two:  on  the  one  hand,  to  pragmatists,  idealists
represented  just  the  kind  of  empty  and  abstract  metaphysical  theorising  that  they
wanted  to  overturn;  while  idealists  on  the  other  hand  traditionally  viewed  the
pragmatists  as  failing  to  resolve  the  problems  that  concern  them  by  refusing  to
metaphysically engage with such problems, offering instead merely a crude appeal to
‘practical consequences.’ What we have seen is that pragmatism is in fact supportive of a
specific variety of metaphysics, a variety for which Hegelianism has considerable affinity;
and that, by consequence, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be
seen as involving more convergence rather than great contestation.
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NOTES
1. Rorty (1982: 80).
2. I  take  my lead  from Adrian  Moore’s  definition  of  metaphysics:  “Metaphysics  is  the  most
general attempt to make sense of things” (A. W. Moore 2012: 1).
3. Putnam (1981: 49). 
4. Rorty (1982: 13). 
5. Rorty (2001: 89).
6. Rorty (1982: xxviii). 
7. Rorty (2002: 391). 
8. See James (2000: 28).
9. Sachs (2013: 700). 
10. Brandom (2002: 216).
11. Houlgate (2007: 139). 
12. Brandom (1994: 647). 
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13. There is also good reason to suppose James’s and F. C. S. Schiller’s explicit hostility to Hegel
may in fact be rather misplaced: had James and Schiller (and Peirce to some extent) had really
known  Hegel,  rather  than  understood  Hegel  via  the  distorted  view  of  him  presented  by
F. E. Abbot, Royce and the British Idealists, James and Schiller (and Peirce to some extent) may
have had a far more positive attitude to Hegel. For all of James’s and Schiller’s caustic criticisms
of  Hegel  as  being  guilty  of  abstract  metaphysical  speculation,  their  respective  critiques  of
abstract  metaphysics  seems  to  echo  Hegel’s  famous  Inverted  World  hypothesis,  which  is  a
landmark criticism of transcendent metaphysics. See Stern 2009 for further on Hegel’s reception
by Peirce and James.
14. See Schiller (1910: 160), and Schiller (1903: 98-9).
15. In writing ‘pure inquiry,’  I  am using Bernard Williams’s characterisation of the Cartesian
philosophical project. 
16. Rorty himself claims that his own philosophical commitments “tend to centre around James’s
version […] of the pragmatic theory of truth” (Rorty 1995: 71).
17. See James (2000: 15). 
18. The  lack  of  phenomenological  robustness  is  not  the  only  problem  with  the  Cartesian
representationalist  tradition,  according  to  Jamesian  pragmatism.  For  James,  another  serious
failing of rationalism and in fact the early modern era in general – where only Reid and Berkeley
appear to radically depart from their contemporaries – is the preference for advocating indirect/
representational  realist  theories  of  perception.  As James writes,  “‘Representative’  theories  of
perception […] violate the reader’s sense of life, which knows no intervening mental image but
seems to see the room and the book immediately just as they physically exist” (James 2003: 6).
19. Brandom (2002: 216).
20. As Cheryl Misak writes on the James-Rorty relationship, “it is tempting to think of [Rorty] as
contemporary pragmatism’s William James” (Misak 2013: 225).
21. See also (James 2003: 100-1).
22. “Forget, for the moment, about the external world, as well as about that dubious interface
between self and world called ‘perceptual experience’” (Rorty 1991: 93).
23. Rorty (1982: xlii).
24. Misak (2013: 230). 
25. “But when will we be done with our caution and care? When will all these shadows of god no
longer darken us? When will  we have completely  de-deified nature? When may we begin to
naturalise humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?” (Nietzsche 2001:
109).
26. Rorty (1982: xiii). 
27. Rorty (1991: 36). 
28. See, for example, Haack 1995. 
29. Rorty (2000: 60). 
30. What is interesting to note here is how Dewey takes pragmatism’s commitment to expanding
the frontiers of inquiry and foster more and more intersubjectivity to express its essential link to
democracy. Rorty, however, does not think there is a link between pragmatism and democracy. 
31. Brandom (1994: 647). 
32. See also (CP: 1.229) and (CP: 7.579). 
33. Stern (2009: 4). 
34. Oderberg (2007: 43). 
35. See Ellis 2002 and Lowe 2006 for an excellent critique of anti-metaphysics. 
36. Lowe (1998: v). 
37. See also: “[P]hilosophy is either a science or it is balderdash” (CP: 5.13).
38. Shermer (2002: 35).
39. Atkins (1995: 132).
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40. Rosenberg (2011: 6-7). 
41. Kitcher (2008: 11). 
42. Boghossian (2006: 4). 
43. As Thomas Goudge writes, “Peirce’s ideas fall naturally into two broad groups whose opposite
character  is  a  reflection  of  a  deep  conflict  in  his  thinking  […]  the  result  of  his  conflicting
commitment to both naturalism and transcendentalism” (Goudge 1950: xx).
44. See the following quote by Rorty: “That mixture of logic-worship, erudition, and romance
was reminiscent of Peirce, with whose writings I had spent a lot of time, hoping to discover the
non-existent secret of his non-existent ‘system’ […] Sellars and Peirce are alike in the diversity
and richness of their talents, as well as in the cryptic style in which they wrote. But Sellars,
unlike Peirce, preached a coherent set of doctrines.” (Rorty 2010: 8).
45. Sachs (2013: 684). 
46. See Stern 2008. 
47. Cf. Hegel (1970 I: 193). 
48. Stone (2004: 2-3). 
49. Peirce’s Hegelianism is in need of qualification: occasionally, Peirce appears to be greatly
indebted to Hegel,  whereas he also sometimes appears extremely dismissive of him. See (CP:
6.293-5) for an example of Peirce’s fondness and contempt for absolute idealism. See Fisch 1974
and Stern 2009 for Peirce’s complex relationship with Hegel. 
50. Cf. 5.210. He also claims that nominalism’s rejection of universals and laws of nature make it
“anti-scientific in essence” (2.166). Peirce’s many arguments that nominalism is anti-scientific
are, in fact, Hegelian arguments: however, Peirce’s claims to this effect have often been better
received and viewed more seriously than Hegel’s, perhaps because the former’s relation to and
understanding of empirical science has generally been taken to be more credible than Hegel’s.
See Stern 2009 for an excellent discussion of Hegel and Peirce’s category of thirdness. See Forster
2011 for an excellent discussion of Peirce’s arguments against nominalism. 
51. W. Sellars (1963: 35). 
52. See Hegel (1975 I: 99-100). 
53. See Hegel (1991: §164Z, 240). For further discussion of this subject, see Stern 2007 and Giladi
2014. 
54. F. C. Beiser (2005: 165). 
55. Aristotle would seem to be an awkward metaphysician to deal with, given his commitment to
a form of  objective idealism – cf.  Lear 1988 and Stern 2008 – and also to some transcendent
notions, such as an immaterial divine intellect. 
56. Hegel (1977b: 105), and Hegel (1977a: §48). 
57. See (Hegel 1995: 258). 
58. (Hegel 1995: 176). 
59. See (CP: 5.402). 
60. Bowman (2013: 7). I acknowledge, though, that a pragmatist critic of Hegel will insist that
Peirce’s  metaphysics  is  more  a  posteriori and  empirically informed  than  Hegel’s  speculative
synthetic a priorism. 
61. Putnam (1983: 246). 
62. Sachs (2013: 701). See also the following quote from Terry Pinkard: “To understand ourselves
as  having  such  a  self-instituted  liberation  from nature,  however,  required  us  to  understand
nature itself as disenchanted, as lacking normative authority on its own” (Pinkard 2007: 149).
63. For further on this tradition of criticising Rorty, see the following works: Alexander 1980,
Bernstein 1980, Brodsky 1982, Edel 1985, Sleeper 1985, Haack 1993, 1995, 1998, and Ramberg 2008.
64. I write ‘reconciling,’ because I think the kind of rapprochement between Hegelian idealism
and pragmatism is importantly different to the kind of rapprochement between Hegelianism and
the Anglo-American naturalist philosophic tradition: Hegel came to be arguably the main target
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of attack by the founders of the analytic movement, Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. To quote
Angelica Nuzzo on this issue: “Rudolf Carnap’s seminal attacks to metaphysical thinking of which
Hegel was seen as the champion, as well as Bertrand Russell’s and G. E. Moore’s rejection of his
‘idealism’ have sufficed to make the case for the radical distance separating Hegel from analytic
philosophy  in  its  very  inception”  (Nuzzo  2010:  1).  In  other  words,  analytic  philosophy  was
founded  squarely  to  repel  and  defeat  Hegelianism.  The  pragmatists,  however,  had  a  more
complex reaction to Hegel: Dewey was rather sympathetic to Hegelianism; James loathed (what
he  understood  to  be)  Hegelian  idealism;  Peirce  admired  and  loathed  Hegelian  thought  in
seemingly equal measure; and more recently, Brandom claims to have had a far-reaching debt to
Hegel. 
ABSTRACTS
The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all
varieties  of  metaphysics  is  fundamentally  mistaken.  After  detailing  pragmatist  reasons  for
thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons
to think Rorty’s metaphilosophical interpretation of pragmatism is rather problematic: firstly,
Rorty has a narrow understanding of ‘metaphysics’ and he does not take into account Peirce’s
argument that it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical concepts from ordinary language and
our scientific practices; secondly, Rorty’s Sellarsian philosophical anthropology and his proto-
Brandomian theory of the constitution of norms are in fact instances of metaphysical positions. I
conclude the paper by claiming that given that pragmatism is in fact supportive of a specific
variety of metaphysics, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be seen as
involving more convergence rather than great contestation.
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